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The Effects of Quotas on Vertical Intra-Industry Trade
Non-Technical Summary
According to recent theoretical studies of imperfect markets, quotas on foreign
competition will increase product qualities, prices and profits of both domestic and foreign
firms under fairly general assumptions.  This view also enjoys widespread empirical support,
for example, for the automobile industry.  The above mentioned results hold, since a quota
imposes a degree of collusion on firms that they could not obtain otherwise.  In doing that, the
quota raises the marginal profitability of product quality for both firms at the former free-trade
qualities; and it does so even if the quota is not binding. One notable exception to the validity
of the results mentioned above can arise with vertically differentiated but still substitutable
products, where one product may be of higher quality than the competing product. Previous
research so far analyzed this case while treating product qualities as unchanged. But to the
best of my knowledge, the preceding competitive stage of quality choice has never been
presented in the literature.  Product quality, however, is a strategic variable for the firm
significantly affecting resulting profits. The choice of product qualities within an industry can
also be influenced by trade policies such as quotas or Voluntary Export Restraints.
In this paper, I specifically analyze the endogenous choice of product qualities within
the framework of vertical product differentiation. I show that a quota on foreign competition
will generally lead to quality-upgrading (downgrading) of the low-quality (high-quality) firm,
an increase in average product quality, and a reduction of domestic consumer surplus,
irrespective of whether the foreign firm produces the higher or lower quality.  The effects of a
quota on industry profits and domestic welfare depend crucially on the direction of
international vertical differentiation.  If the foreign firm produces low quality, both firms'
prices and profits will rise but domestic welfare will fall.  This describes well some major
effects of a Japanese Voluntary Export Restraint in the US auto market and relevant empirical
findings. If the foreign firm produces high quality, foreign profits will fall.  Since domestic
consumer surplus falls only unsubstantially, domestic profit gains will lead to an overall
increase of domestic welfare.
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Abstract
A quota on foreign competition will generally lead to quality-upgrading (downgrading) of the
low-quality (high-quality) firm, an increase in average quality, a reduction of quality
differentiation, and a reduction of domestic consumer surplus, irrespective of whether the
foreign firm produces higher or lower quality.  Effects of a quota on industry profits and
domestic welfare depend crucially on the direction of international vertical differentiation.  If
the foreign firm produces low quality, both firms' prices and profits rise but domestic welfare
falls.  This describes well some major effects of a Japanese VER in the US auto market and
relevant empirical findings.  If the foreign firm produces high quality, foreign profits will fall.
Since domestic consumer surplus falls only unsubstantially, domestic profit gains lead to an
increase of domestic welfare.
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1The Effects of Quotas on Vertical Intra-Industry Trade
1.  Introduction
According to recent theoretical studies of imperfect markets, quotas on foreign
competition will increase qualities, prices and profits of both domestic and foreign firms under
fairly general assumptions (Falvey 1979, Rodriguez 1979, Das and Donnenfeld 1987, Harris
1985, Krishna 1989 and 1990)1.  This view has also found widespread empirical support, for
example, for the automobile industry (Feenstra 1984, 1985, 1988, 1993; Goldberg 1992,
1994).2  The above mentioned results obtain, since a quota imposes on firms a degree of
collusion that they could not obtain otherwise.  In doing that, it raises the marginal
profitability of quality for both firms at the former free-trade qualities; and it does so even if
the quota is not binding.  Therefore, the quota also changes the nature of oligopolistic
competition.  This is the oligopolistic analogue to the case of a domestic monopoly (Bhagwati
1965).
However, theoretical research by Krishna (1987), Das and Donnenfeld (1989), and
Herguera, Kujal, Petrakis (1994) suggest that a quota could also lead to quality downgrading
of the domestic or the foreign quality.  Krishna analyzes a monopoly, while both the latter
approaches assume a duopoly with Cournot competition in the last stage of the industry-game.
However, the duopoly studies differ in the exact timing of the games analyzed.
Krishna (1989) emphasizes the importance of the form of last stage game for the
resulting payoff functions of the firms.  Important attributes are the chosen strategic variables
(prices, quantities), the form of the restrictions or policy variables (quotas, tariffs), the
sequencing of the game (simultaneous, Leader-Follower, quality first or quality jointly with
price, etc.).  She shows that a quota will still lead to increased prices and profits for both firms
for the case of differentiated substitute products and simultaneous price competition.  But the
                                                          
1 Falvey (1987), Rodriguez (1987), Das/Donnenfeld (1987) and Krishna (1987) deal with cases of perfect
competition or monopoly.    Other studies take oligopolistic competition into account but assume exogenously
fixed product qualities (Leland 1979, Shapiro 1983).  Harris (1985) and Krishna (1989) model in effect
horizontal product differentiation and do not analyze effects on the quality stage.
2 Similar findings have been forwarded by Boorstein and Feenstra (1991) for the steel industry, by Aw and
Roberts (1986, 1988) for the footwear industry, and by Anderson (1985, 1991) for the cheese industry.  Mintz
(1973) found that U.S. quotas on meat, dairy products, textiles, and sugur lead to increased import qualities.
2price equilibrium will now involve mixed-strategies on the part of the domestic firm.
However, she does not analyze the previous stage of quality choice, treating quality in effect
as unchanged.  But given the research received so far, effects on quality are just what we are
interested in.3  Product quality is a strategic variable for the firm that can be influenced by
trade policy4 and especially by quotas or Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs).
The conceptual economic framework that explicitly includes these vertical quality
aspects into the analysis is provided by models of vertical product differentiation.  Using this
approach, I show that a quota (near the free-trade level) on foreign competition will generally
lead to quality-upgrading (downgrading) of the low-quality (high-quality) firm, an increase in
average product quality, a reduction of quality differentiation, and a reduction of domestic
consumer surplus, irrespective of whether the foreign firm produces the higher or lower
quality.  The effects of a quota on industry profits and domestic welfare depend crucially on
the direction of international vertical differentiation.  If the foreign firm produces low quality,
both firms' prices and profits will rise but domestic welfare will fall.  This describes well some
major effects of a Japanese VER in the US auto market and relevant empirical findings.5  If
the foreign firm produces high quality, foreign profits will fall.  Since domestic consumer
surplus falls only unsubstantially, domestic profit gains will lead to an overall increase of
domestic welfare.
For our model6, analytical solutions for all equilibrium variables are available for the
unregulated case7 and the case of a quota at the free-trade level.  As for the unregulated case,
solutions for the free-trade-quota case are linear functions of the ratio of a market-size
parameter (raised to some integer power) and a cost parameter.8  The effects of changing the
                                                          
3 Vertical quality differentiation ("high" vs. "low" product quality) between substitutable products is, of course,
an important dimension in international trade, since trade in differentiated but substitutable products (intra-
industry trade) has grown most in the last decades.
4 See also Levinsohn (1988), Feenstra (1993), Menzler-Hokkanen (1994).
5 Empirical studies of the U.S. car market find quality upgrading also for U.S. cars.  However, there are some
conceptual problems with these studies that will be discussed at the end of the paper.  This might indicate, that
this empirical research at least supports the notion of reduced quality differentiation as a quota effect.
Furthermore, a highly binding quota will still lead to quality upgrading of all products within the vertical-
differentiation framework.
6 The model setup used here is based on an earlier, unpublished paper presented at the ZEI, Bonn (Lutz 1997).
7 These solutions and their derivation for the unregulated case are well-known (e.g. Ronnen 1991, Motta 1993,
Lutz 1996).
8 All solutions were obtained using Mathematica.
3quota marginally starting at the free-trade level are investigated using simulations for
benchmark values of market-size and cost parameters.  These results are presented
graphically.9  Changing these benchmark values does not suggest any qualitative changes in
the results.  Interpretation of these results also makes use of other analytical results presented
so far in the literature.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the basic
analytical framework, the price and quality stages of the industry game, and the simulation
procedure.  Section 3 reviews the analytical results and the simulations. Section 4 presents
discussions of the empirical significance as well as the robustness of the results.  Section 5
concludes.
2.  Vertical Product Differentiation
The standard model of duopolistic competition with endogenous product qualities has
been developed since the beginning of the 80s (Mussa/Rosen 1978, Gabszewicz/Thisse 1979,
Shaked/Sutton 1982, Ronnen 1991).  Consumers have identical preferences and different
incomes.  The income differences lead to differences in the willingness to pay for a particular
product quality.  Two firms (domestic and foreign) offer products of different qualities in one
(domestic) market.  The firms bear quality-dependent costs and compete in qualities and
prices in a two-stage industry game.  Since higher product differentiation reduces
substitutability and price competition, even identical firms will offer distinct qualities in the
resulting market equilibrium.  Trade will take place since the foreign firm operates in the
domestic market.  (In the two-market extension, both firms operate in both markets.)  National
governments can use trade policy to improve the strategic position of domestic industries.10
There is also the possibility of strategic noncooperative interaction between two national
governments.
                                                          
9 The procedure is the same as in Lutz (1998), where the effects of tariffs where investigated.
10 See e.g. Brander/Spencer 1984, Krishna 1989.
42.1.  The Model
There are two firms, the domestic firm d and the foreign firm f, both competing in the
domestic market.  If both firms remain in the market, then they produce distinct goods, sold at
prices pd and pf, respectively.  The two products carry a single quality attribute denoted by sd
and sf, respectively.  Either firm faces production costs that are increasing, convex (quadratic)
functions of quality, the exact level of which depending on quality chosen and a quality cost
parameter b.  Marginal costs are equal to zero for both firms.  Total costs of firm i are then:
ci = bi si2 (1)
In the domestic market, there is a continuum of consumers (indexed by t) distributed
uniformly over the interval [0, T] with unit density.11  Each consumer purchases at most one
unit of either firm d's product or firm f's product.  The higher a consumer's income parameter
t, the higher is her (his) reservation price.  Consumer t's utility is given by equation (2) if good
i is purchased.12  Consumers who do not purchase receive zero utility.
ut = si t - pi (2)
The domestic government and firms d and f play a three-stage game13.  In the first
stage, the government sets an ad-valorem tariff on foreign imports.  In the second stage, firms
determine qualities to be produced and incur costs ci (i = d, f).  In the third stage, firms choose
prices simultaneously (Bertrand competition).  Since the derivation of market equilibria
without quotas is generally known and straightforward, it is relegated to the Appendix.
2.2.      Price Competition and Mixed Strategies
The introduction of a quota substantially alters the price game between firms, leading
to mixed-strategy pricing by the domestic firm (but not the foreign firm).  The domestic firm
randomizes between a price that makes the quota binding on the foreign firm and a price that
does not (leading to foreign quantity below the quota).  If the quota is binding, we assume the
                                                          
11 The parameter t represents willingness to pay and increases with income. Let U[0,T] be the Uniform
probability distribution.  Then this distribution of consumers corresponds to T*U[0,T] with density T*1/(T-0)=1
for all t, regardless of the upper bound T.  The total mass of consumers representing population size is equal to T,
while the average income parameter T/2 represents per-capita income.
12 Consumers who do not purchase receive zero utility.
13 In this formulation, firm i not entering the market is equivalent to  firm i choosing si = 0.  The entry decision by
firms is made simultaneously when choosing quality.
5rationing rule is given by costless arbitrage.  This implies that the domestic firm faces a
demand when making the quota binding that is identical to its demand if the foreign firm
chooses a price to equate foreign demand with the quota (even though the foreign firm
actually charges a lower price).14  The actual derivation of the price strategies and equilibria is
identical to Krishna (1989, pp. 88-94) and is illustrated in Figure 1.15
2.3.  Quality Choice
The derivation of quality best responses and equilibrium qualities is, in principle,
almost identical to the derivation of the results without regulation shown in the appendix.  The
only difference is, that revenue und consumer surplus functions are now convex combinations
of the respective functions given one of two domestic price realizations.  The relative weights
are given by the probability  that the domestic firm chooses the higher price which makes the
quota binding.  As for the unregulated case, solutions for the free-trade-quota case are linear
functions of the ratio of a market-size parameter (raised to some integer power) and a cost
parameter.16  These solutions are reported in Table 1.
Some changes in the properties of quality best responses are indicated by the
simulation results indicated below.  The existence of a quota flattens both quality best
responses.  A quota-constrained firm faces a lower resulting revenue increase from a quality
increase, because its quantity is constrained.  If it increases quality, it will also strongly
increase price since it cannot gain much through quantity increases  The unconstrained firm
will react with a (costless) price increase rather than a (costly) quality increase.  For the case
of a quota on the foreign low-quality firm, this even leads to a slightly negative slope of the
high-quality best response.
                                                          
14 Boccard/Wauthy (1998) discuss the the existence of a case where this rationing rule is violated. Such a case
may arise when the foreign firm offers low quality and due to the fundamental asymmetry given by vertical
product differentiation. Given that a foreign low-quality firm is restricted by a quota, a domestic high-quality firm
now has an alternative choice of capturing foreign customers at the lower end of the income distribution by price
(and quality) decreases. However, since in our model setup, cost of quality development are assumed to be
independent of quantity produced and high quality is not fixed, the resulting high-quality profits and marginal
profits are so high as to prevent this case.
15 For the case of costless production and a fixed higher quality, the derivation of price strategy and equilibria is
also developed in Boccard/Wauthy (1998). Consequently their free-trade setup is based on Choi/Shin (1992).
16 All solutions were obtained using Mathematica.  They are available upon request.
62.4.  Simulations
The paper presents 2 simulations, making a distinction between the case of low quality
produced domestically (A) and high quality produced domestically (B).  For the derivation of
the simulations shown graphically, market size equals T=1 and cost parameter b=1.17  The
quota is then varied between 80% and 110% of the free-trade level of imports for either case.
The results are summarized in 18 figures per simulation, showing the foreign quota
quantity, the foreign lower quantity (when the quota is not binding), the probability that the
quota binds, the equilibrium ratio of high to low quality, the equilibrium qualities, (expected)
profits, (expected) consumer surplus, (expected) domestic welfare, (expected) average prices,
the domestic higher and lower prices, (expected) average quantities, and the domestic higher
and lower quantities respectively.  The horizontal axis shows the ratio of the quota to the free-
trade-level (1 represents the free-trade level).  Hence the quota becomes more binding towards
the left end of a particular graph.  Alternative calculations suggest that changes in parameters
for each simulation (other than cost differences between firms) would not alter the qualitative
results.
3.  Quotas on Foreign Competition
The results presented in this section are grouped into analytical results of a quota
introduced at the free-trade level and simulation results of changing that quota level.
3.1.  Effects of Introducing a Quota at the Free-Trade-Level
A quota at the free-trade level on foreign competition will generally lead to quality-
upgrading (downgrading) of the low-quality (high-quality) firm, an increase in average
product quality, a reduction of quality differentiation, and a reduction of domestic consumer
surplus, irrespective of whether the foreign firm produces the higher or lower quality.  But the
effects of a quota on industry profits and domestic welfare depend crucially on the direction of
international vertical differentiation.
                                                          
17 The results for a quota at the free-trade level only are generally valid for any positive values of T and b, since
these variables enter strictly in a multiplicative way, once the quota is fixed.
7If the foreign firm produces low quality, both firms' prices and profits will rise but
domestic welfare will fall.  The fall in domestic welfare is due to three effects:  high quality
decreases, prices rise, total quantity bought (of both goods) falls.  The last effect reduces
market participation (share of consumers buying either good) to such an extent, that this
negative effect overcompensates for an increase in average quality.  The increase in average
quality is the result of the reduced market share of the low-quality product.
If the foreign firm produces high quality, foreign profits will fall.  The foreign firm is
bound by the quota, but it cannot profitably increase its already high and costly quality.  Since
its quantity must be reduced, it actually needs to decrease its quality.  However, the domestic
low-quality firm increases quality substantially.  This leads to a decrease in quality-adjusted
price of the low-quality good while the high quality good becomes relatively more expensive.
For the consumers as a whole, these two effects almost cancel out.  Therefore, domestic
consumer surplus falls only unsubstantially, and domestic profit gains will lead to an overall
increase of domestic welfare.
3.2.  Effects of Changing the Level of an Existing Quota
As a function of the quota level, the quota-constrained equilibrium quality exhibits a
concave shape (with the maximum near the free-trade level), while the domestic equilibrium
quality is decreasing in a quota increase (relaxing the constraint), irrespective of the ordering
of qualities.  Similarly, the profits of the quota-constrained firm exhibit concave shapes, while
the profits of the domestic firm decrease when the quota is relaxed.  Domestic consumer
surplus and domestic welfare increase generally with a relaxing of the quota.
Significant differences depending on the ordering of qualities arise with respect to
quality differentiation and changes in low-quality quantity.  With a quota on high quality,
quality differentiation decreases with a tightening of the quota.  Low-quality quantity rises
while high-quality quantity falls with a tighter quota, leading to only small changes in total
quantity sold.  With a quota on low quality, quality differentiation exhibits a U-shape (with the
minimum near the free-trade level).  Consequently, quality differentiation rises with a
8tightening of the quota away from the free-trade level.  This tightening of the quota also leads
to decreases of both quantities.
This difference explains the relatively weaker negative effect on consumer surplus for
a quota on the high-quality firm.  It also explains why a foreign high-quality firm is harmed
more by the tightening of a quota (away from the free-trade level).
4.  Discussion
In this section, I first review empirical findings about the U.S. auto market in light of
the presented theory.  This is followed by a discussion of robustness issues.
4.1.  Empirical Results
The standard empirical case cited is the development of the US car market during the
1980s, where Japanese imports where subjected to both quantity constraints and tariffs.  To
my knowledge, there is no closure yet on the debate whether quality upgrading was induced by
tariffs, VERs, or a combination of both.  However, the general notion is that the quality of
Japanese cars was initially lower than that of U.S. cars, and that it was upgraded.  Feenstra
(1993) reports a quality increase of Japanese cars.  Goldberg (1992, 1994) performed trade-
policy simulations using an econometric model of US car demand, coming to the conclusion
that quotas lead to quality upgrading, while tariffs might lead to downgrading.  Goldberg also
reports quality-upgrading for U.S. cars, while Feenstra does not analyze the effects on U.S.
cars.  I want to argue that the case of a quota on a low-quality foreign firm in my model
describes the U.S-Japan auto case well.
On first glance, Goldberg's results seem to contradict two of my theoretical results.
These are decreased quality differentiation and a decrease in high quality.  However, Goldberg
infers an increase of quality for U.S. products from a demand shift towards higher-quality car
models.  She does not actually analyze any quality change of these car models.  This result is
arguably better comparable to my theoretical result of average quality increases.  From
anectodal evidence (for example comparisons of reliability of Japanese and U.S. cars in the
91980s), I would also argue that the first reaction of U.S. car firms the quotas was to not put as
much effort into quality improvement of their own models as they would have done otherwise.
It is also noteworthy, that this theoretical model predicts the same tariff effects as
shown in Goldberg's work, namely a quality decrease (see also Lutz 1998).  Noting that the
tariff affects low-quality Japanese cars, this would also relieve the pressure on U.S. firms to
increase the quality of their cars to some extent.
4.2.  Robustness of the Model
With Cournot competition instead of Bertrand competition, many of the results
presented above remain valid.  Analyzing the case of Cournot competition,
Herguera/Kujal/Petrakis (2000) have shown that a quota on a foreign low-quality firm will
lead to upgrading of the foreign product, downgrading of the domestic product, decrease in
differentiation and increase of average (quantity-weighted) quality.
5.  Conclusions
This paper has demonstrated that the direction of international vertical differentiation
can be a major factor in determining the results of trade policies such as quotas or VERs.
Furthermore, empirical observations such as for the U.S. auto market can be more fully
explained taking the direction of quality differentiation into account.
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Appendix
(All calculations are available upon request.)
The Model Without Quotas
This appendix demonstrates the derivation of the unconstrained market equilibria for
the model presented in Section 2.  Firms d and f play a two-stage game18.  In the first stage,
firms determine qualities to be produced and incur costs ci (i = d, f).  In the second stage,
firms choose prices simultaneously.19
Price Competition
To solve the game, consider first the demand faced by the high-quality and low-quality
firm, respectively.  Let h and o stand for high and low quality, respectively.  These demands
are then given by:20
q T ( p p
s s
)h h o
h o
 


,  q p p
s s
p
so
h o
h o
o
o



   (A.3.1)
Let i = h, o; let j  i.  The profit function for firm i is given by i = piqi(pi,pj,si,sj) -
ci(si).  Taken both qualities as given, the price reaction functions in each market are given as
the solutions to the first order conditions.  Solving the resulting equations for both prices,
equilibrium prices are then given as:
p 2Ts (s s )
4s s
,    p = T(s s )s
4s sh
h h o
h o
o
h 0 o
h o





(A.4.1)
Note that for all sh > so, T > th > to > 0 will hold, i.e., equation (A.4.1) is in fact an
unconstrained price equilibrium.
Given the price equilibrium depicted above, demands and thus profits can be expressed
in terms of qualities.  For positive qualities si (i = h, o), these profit functions are:
h
2
h
2
h 0
h 0
2 h h
24T s (s s )
(4s s )
b s 

 ,  o
2
h h o o
h o
2 o o
2T s (s s )s
(4s s )
b s 

 (A.5.1)
Similarly, consumer surplus21 can be expressed in the following way:
                                                          
18 In this formulation, firm i not entering the market is equivalent to  firm i choosing si = 0.  The entry decision by
firms is made simultaneously when choosing quality.
19 To derive solutions, we will use the concept of subgame-perfect equilibrium, computing the solutions for each
stage in reverse order.  Both firms choose their respective product quality from the same interval [0, ).  The
resulting market equilibria will include some consumers in the lower segment of the interval [0, T] not valuing
quality enough to buy any product.  This guarantees an interior solution of the price game.
20 Let th = (ph - po)/(sh - so) and to = po/so.  Consumers with t = po/so will be indifferent between buying the
low-quality product and not buying at all.  Consumers with t = (ph - po)/(sh - so) will be indifferent between
buying either the high-quality or the low-quality product.  Consumers with T ### t > th will buy high quality,
consumers with th > t > to will buy low quality, and consumers with t < po/so will  not buy at all.
21 Consumer surplus is defined as {(t*sh - ph)dt + (t*so - po)dt} where the first integral goes from th to T and
the second goes from to to th.
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Properties of the Revenue and Consumer Surplus Functions
Let Ri denote firm i's revenue function.  Let h and o denote high and low quality,
respectively.
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Let CSI (I = D, F) denote region I's consumer surplus function.  Firms' qualities are
denoted by sh and so for high  and low quality, respectively.
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Quality Competition
To derive the firms' quality best responses, we investigate each firm's profit function,
given the other firm's quality choice, and taking into account the behavior in the price-setting
subgame.  Given the order of qualities, the profit functions in equations (A.5.1) are concave in
the respective firm´s own quality.  The profit-maximizing choices form a Nash-equilibrium in
qualities, where both marginal profit functions evaluate to zero.  The first order conditions for
the high and low quality firm, respectively, are then given as:
4T s (4s 3s s 2s ) / (4s s )  2b s2 h h
2
h o o
2
h o
3
h h    
T s (4s 7s ) / (4s s )  2b s2 h
2
h o h o
3
o o  
(A.9.1)
The slopes of the high and low quality firms' quality best responses can be calculated (using
the implicit function theorem) as dsi/dsj = -((i/si)/sj)/((i/si)/si), where i is either
high or low quality and j is the other quality.  Both slopes are positive, but less than one.
From the properties of the revenue functions and the slopes of the quality best
responses, it can be derived that the two qualities are strategic complements.  Furthermore, a
forced increase of the low quality will reduce product differentiation and increase price
competition.
Divide the first order conditions given in (A.9), rearrange and write sh = r so and bo =
a bh to obtain:
a
r
7r4r
)4r3r4(2
2
2



For a=1 ( i.e. bo = bh = b) r = 5.25123 while for a=2 ( i.e. bo = 2 bh = 2 b) r = 9.14152.  Using
r to express sh in terms of so and substituting for sh in the first equation of (A.9.1) allows for
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calculating the equilibrium qualities for any given value of T and b.  (However, the ratio of
cost parameters a must be fixed.)
The resulting equilibrium qualities for identical firms (i.e. bh = bo = b) are then:22
sh = 0.126655 T
2 / b and so = 0.0241192 T
2 / b
The resulting equilibrium profits for identical firms (i.e. bh = bo = b) are then:
h = 0.012219 T
4 / b and o = 0.0007637 T
4 / b
Quota and Price Competition
Figure 1 shows the actual calculated price best responses for the parameter set {T=1,
b=1, sf=0.126655, sd=0.241192 and quot=0.262497}, i.e. the domestic firm produces high
quality and the foreign firm is subjected to a quota equal to ist free-trade quantity choice.
The graph also includes iso-profit lines of the domestic firm, where domestic profits
increase to the right and interior of a particular contour line, i.e. with increases in foreign
price.
Figure 1
             Pd
                   pdh
0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.01
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
pbrf
pqrf
pbrd
                                                               pf*                                                       pf
The straight lines pbrd and pbrf are the domestic and foreign free-trade price best
responses, respectively. As usual they are both upward-sloping. Since the foreign firm
produces low quality, its best response starts from the origin. Originally, the foreign firm is
not quota-constrained when moving upward along ist best response since ist optimal price
choice is high relative to domestic price. The line pqrf denotes the ratio of domestic to foreign
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price choice such that the quota would be exactly binding. It becomes the foreign firm’s best
response from the point of their intersection.
In equilibrium, the foreign, low-quality producer chooses pf* while the domestic, high-
quality producer randomizes between pdh and pbrd(pf*).At pf*, the domestic firm is indiffernt
between using the quota to choose the higher price and playing its free-trade best response. An
equilibrium is obtained when the domestic firm chooses the probability for the higher price 
such that the expected price induces the foreign firm to choose pf* as best response.
                                                                                                                                                                                     
22 Note that T2/b enters in a multiplicative way and therefore does not affect the calculations.
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Table 1.  Results
Variable Unregulated Quota Firm 1 Quota Firm 2
s11) 0.126655 0.126431 0.124638
s21) 0.0241192 0.0282038 0.0255657
s1/s2 5.25123 4.48276 4.87520
Average s 0.0924764 0.0930464 0.0934694
 0 0.03261 0.20204
p12) 0.0538309 0.0529348 0.0538612
p22) 0.00512555 0.00593017 0.00606684
q13) 0.524994 0.521329 0.518993
q23) 0.262497 0.268409 0.238224
Total q 0.787491 0.789738 0.757217
PI14) 0.0122193 0.0116117 0.0123597
PI24) 0.000763706 0.000795456 0.00079166
CS4) 0.0216091 0.0216089 0.0207368
W14) 0.0338284 - 0.0330966
W24) 0.022372806 0.022404356 -
1) Multiply values with T2/b;  2) Multiply values with T3/b
3) Multiply values with T;  4) Multiply values with T4/b
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Case A.  Quota on the Foreign High-Quality Firm
(Domestic Low-Quality Firm Randomizes Price)
0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1.05 1.1
0.425
0.45
0.475
0.525
0.55
0.575
A.1. Quota
0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1.05 1.1
0.425
0.45
0.475
0.525
0.55
0.575
A.2.  Foreign Lower Quantity
0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1.05 1.1
-0.2
-0.1
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
A.3.  Probability Binding Quota
0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1.05 1.1
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
A.4.  Quality Ratio
0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1.05 1.1
0.1245
0.1255
0.126
0.1265
0.127
A.5.  Foreign Quality
0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1.05 1.1
0.025
0.035
0.04
A.6.  Domestic Quality
0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1.05 1.1
0.009
0.0095
0.0105
0.011
0.0115
A.7.  Foreign Profits
0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1.05 1.1
0.0006
0.0008
0.0012
0.0014
0.0016
0.0018
A.8.  Domestic Profits
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0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1.05 1.1
0.019
0.021
0.022
0.023
0.024
A.9.  Domestic Consumer Surplus
0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1 1.05 1.1
0.021
0.022
0.023
0.024
0.025
A.10.  Domestic Welfare
0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1.05 1.1
0.019
0.021
0.022
0.023
0.024
A.11. Foreign Average Price
0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1.05 1.1
0.004
0.005
0.006
0.007
0.008
0.009
0.011
A.12.  Domestic Average Price
0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1.05 1.1
0.005
0.006
0.007
0.008
0.009
0.011
0.012
A.13.  Domestic Higher Price
0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1.05 1.1
0.005
0.006
0.007
0.008
0.009
A.14.  Domestic Lower Price
0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1.05 1.1
0.425
0.45
0.475
0.525
0.55
0.575
A.15. Foreign Average Quantity
0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1.05 1.1
0.24
0.26
0.28
0.32
A.16.  Domestic Average Quantity
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0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1.05 1.1
0.24
0.26
0.28
A.17.  Domestic Higher Quantity
0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1.05 1.1
0.24
0.26
0.28
0.32
0.34
A.18. Domestic Lower  Quantity
Case B.  Quota on the Foreign Low-Quality Firm
(Domestic High-Quality Firm Randomizes Price)
0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1.05 1.1
0.24
0.26
0.28
B.1. Quota
0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1.05 1.1
0.18
0.22
0.24
0.26
B.2.  Foreign Lower Quantity
0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1.05 1.1
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
B.3.  Probability Binding Quota
0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1.05 1.1
4.88
4.92
4.94
4.96
B.4.  Quality Ratio
0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1.05 1.1
0.0252
0.0253
0.0254
0.0255
B.5.  Foreign Quality
0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1.05 1.1
0.12465
0.1247
0.12475
B.6.  Domestic Quality
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0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1.05 1.1
0.00077
0.00078
0.00079
B.7.  Foreign Profits
0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1.05 1.1
0.0122
0.0124
0.0126
0.0128
B.8.  Domestic Profits
0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1.05 1.1
0.0195
0.0205
0.021
0.0215
B.9.  Domestic Consumer Surplus
0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1.05 1.1
0.0324
0.0326
0.0328
0.0332
0.0334
0.0336
B.10.  Domestic Welfare
0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1.05 1.1
0.0055
0.00575
0.00625
0.0065
0.00675
0.007
B.11. Foreign Average Price
0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1.05 1.1
0.054
0.055
0.056
B.12.  Domestic Average Price
0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1.05 1.1
0.0586
0.0588
0.0592
0.0594
0.0596
0.0598
B.13.  Domestic Higher Price
0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1.05 1.1
0.0524
0.0526
0.0528
0.0532
0.0534
B.14.  Domestic Lower Price
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0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1.05 1.1
0.21
0.22
0.23
0.24
0.25
0.26
B.15. Foreign Average Quantity
0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1.05 1.1
0.5125
0.515
0.5175
0.52
0.5225
0.525
B.16.  Domestic Average Quantity
0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1.05 1.1
0.474
0.476
0.478
B.17.  Domestic Higher Quantity
0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1.05 1.1
0.528
0.532
0.534
B.18. Domestic Lower  Quantity
